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Abstract
A new cryptosystem based on the fundamental time–energy uncertainty relation
is proposed. Such a cryptosystem can be implemented with both correlated photon
pairs and single photon states.
Quantum cryptography is based on the following two features of quantum theory.
First, the stochastic nature of the measurement results in quantum mechanics allows two
distant observes to perform measurements of an appropriate physical quantity on a system
prepared in some special states to get a pair of perfectly correlated random sequences of
zeros and units which can be used as a key [1–9]. Second, any eavesdropper or intruder
attempting to affect the key generation procedure can be detected because of the fact that
generally the system wavefunction before the measurement cannot be determined from
the results of that measurement [10].
Proposed in the present paper is a new cryptosystem whose security is based on the
quantum mechanical time–energy uncertainty relation.
The cryptosystem is based on a joint measurement of the correlated two-photon (bipho-
ton) states of the radiation field, although it will be seen that a cryptosystem of that kind
can also be implemented with single-photon states with different frequencies, which is very
important from the point of view of its physical realization.
A biphoton field is written as
|Ψ〉 = exp (−iω0t)
∫
g(ω)|1〉ω |1〉ω0 − ωdω, (1)
where |1〉ω is the single-photon state with frequency ω, ω0 is a certain fixed frequency
(which is the sum of frequencies of two photons occurring in the biphoton), and g(ω) is
the function defining the biphoton spectrum width.
The key generation procedure employs the photodetectors with different registration
bandwidth. Suppose that the two users A and B register the photons with the photode-
tectors having central frequencies ωA,B and bandwidths γA,B. Let an atom be prepared
in the excited state at the moment t = 0 and the photons are detected by the users at t0A
and t0B , respectively. The biphoton field correlation function for a joint measurement by
the two users depends on the relative delay of reduced registration moments T = tB − tA,
where tA,B = t
0
A,B − rA,B/c (rA,B is the distance between the source and the users, and c
is the velocity of light in the medium) [11], and can be written in the following form:
P (T ) = (2piγAγB)
2
θ(T ) exp (−2γBT ) + θ(−T ) exp (2γAT )
Ω2 + (γA + γB)
2
, (2)
Ω = ω0 − ωA − ωB.
Here θ(T ) is the step function.
If the biphoton field is measured by two narrow-band detectors (γA,B → 0), they can
only fire simultaneously if ωA + ωB = ω0, i.e., when the users employ the detectors with
two complementary frequencies:
P (T ) ∝ δ(ω0 − ωA − ωB) ≡ photon energies are correlated. (3)
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When the radiation field defined by Eq.(1) is measured by two wide-band detectors
(γA,B →∞), it follows from Eq.(2) that
P (T ) ∝ δ(tB − tA) ≡ photon detection moments are correlated. (4)
When employing the narrow-band photodetectors, (γ → 0, Eq.(3)), the difference between
photon registration times by the two users T can have any value in the interval −∞ <
T <∞.
On the other hand, if the wide-band photodetectors are used (γ → ∞, Eq.(4)) the
difference between the reduced photon registration times is very close to zero (to within
∼ 1/γ → 0); however, in this case no information on the energy (frequency) of the photons
is gained.
The key generation protocol consists of the following steps:
1) The users select two fixed frequencies ω1 and ω2 such that ω1+ω2 = ω0. In each mea-
surement users A and B randomly (and independently of each other) choose either
wide-band or one of the two narrow-band photodetectors with central frequencies
ω1 and ω2.
2) After a series of measurements is completed, all the measurements where at least
one of the detectors did not fire are discarded.
3) The users announce through a public channel which photodetectors (wide- or narrow-
band) they used in each measurement, but do not specify which of the two narrow
band detectors (ω1 or ω2) was used in a particular measurement.
4) Since only the measurements where both photodetectors fired are considered, the
measurements where both users employed the narrow-band photodetectors yield two
perfectly correlated random sequences which can be used as a key. For instance, if
user A employed the detector with ω1, he knows that the other detector could only
fire if user B employed the detector with ω2 (this event is regarded as correspond-
ing to logical 1), and vice versa, if user A employed the detector with ω2, user B
necessarily employed the detector centered about ω1 (logical 0).
To detect possible eavesdropping at the key generation stage, the users can analyze the
measurements where they both employed the wide-band detectors. In that case users A
and B actually measure the relative delay time tB − tA (the line length is assumed to
be known). If no eavesdropping took place, T = tB − tA = 0 (to within 1/γA,B → 0);
on the contrary, any eavesdropping attempt would result in T 6= 0. Indeed, to obtain
information on the key (i.e., to determine the photon frequency), the eavesdropper should
use a narrow-band photodetector with the bandwidth γ∗ → 0, since a wide-band detector
cannot distinguish between the photons with energies ω1 and ω2, which carry the informa-
tion on the key. Since the photodetector types are chosen by users A and B in a random
way, the situations where users A and B employed wide-band detectors (i.e., they should
have T = 0) while the eavesdropper employed a narrow-band detector (measured the pho-
ton energy with the accuracy γ∗ → 0) will inevitably occur. However, according to the
quantum mechanical time–energy uncertainty relation
∆E∆t ≥ h¯, (5)
such a measurement cannot be performed during the time interval shorter than h¯/γ∗.
Therefore, users A and B will be able to detect eavesdropping by a systematic deviation
of the difference between the reduced photon registration moments T = tB− tA from zero.
It should be noted that the situation with Eq.(5) is not as simple as for uncertainty
relations for other variables, such as coordinate and momentum, or different spin compo-
nents. In spite of a long history [12–18], both the validity of relation (5) and interpretation
of the quantities ∆E and ∆t are still discussed in the literature (see a review article [16]).
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According to Ref.[16], the problem of validity of relation (5) reduces to choosing between
the following two statements:
1) Scatter of the energy of a quantum system ∆E before and after the measurement
satisfies the inequality (5), where ∆t is the measurement procedure duration, i.e.,
arbitrarily fast measurements which do not disturb the state of a quantum systems
are impossible.
2) It is possible to realize arbitrarily fast measurements which do not disturb the quan-
tum system energy, and, therefore, violate inequality (5).
Strictly speaking, there are specific examples of explicitly time-dependent Hamiltonians
(see e.g., Refs.[17,18]) violating inequality (5). Hence, the problem of validity of Eq.(5)
reduces to the possibility (or impossibility) of the physical realization of a particular
Hamiltonian allowed by quantum mechanics as a formal mathematical scheme [16]; it
should be emphasized here that so far no physical realization of the Hamiltonians formally
violating Eq.(5) has been proposed. At the same time, it is obvious that it is natural to
consider only the physically realizable Hamiltonians [12–16]. Therefore, at present there
is every ground to consider Eq.(5) as a fundamental law of Nature. We shall adopt this
orthodox point of view [12–16] and assume that it is impossible to precisely measure the
photon energy in an arbitrarily short time interval.
As an illustration, consider the situation where user A employs a wide-band photode-
tector (γA → ∞), while the other (eavesdropper which is now playing the role of user
B) employs a narrow-band one (γB → 0). In this case user B always registers a photon
with a certain delay time which can take any positive value with equal probability. To
understand this result qualitatively, the process of photodetection can be viewed in the
following way. We shall assume that the photodetector consists of an absorber (two-level
“atoms”) which is tunnel-coupled to a macroscopic “electrode”. The electron lifetime at
the quasistationary level after the absorption of a photon is determined by the level width
(this lifetime is actually the measurement duration: on the average, it is the time taken
by electron to leave the quantum system and reach the classical one (electrode)). In a
wide-band detector (γA →∞) the level width is large, so that the absorbed photon energy
cannot be precisely determined. However, in that case the photodetection process is fast
because of a rapid electron transition to the electrode. In a narrow-band detector (γB → 0)
the photon is only absorbed if its frequency coincides with the separation between the two
levels. On the other hand, the photodetection process is slow, and in the limit γB = 0
the electron oscillates between the two levels [19] without tunneling into the electrode, so
that the measurement (photodetection) is formally infinitely long (it is this feature of the
photodetection process which results in the delay of the photon registration time by user
B).
Thus, if Eq.(5) holds (statement 1), it is impossible to measure the photon frequency
by a narrow-band detector in an arbitrarily short time interval (this would violate Eq.(5)),
and this circumstance can be used to detect eavesdropping.
It should be emphasized that the inevitable time delay between the measurements of
users A and B in the described protocol originates from the fundamental relation (5) rather
than the technical complexities introduced by the users. By increasing the fraction of
measurements employing the wide-band photodetectors, the probability of detection of
the eavesdropper can be made arbitrarily close to unity.
Obviously, the less is the difference between ω1 and ω2, the worse is the situation for the
eavesdropper; currently the difference |ω1−ω2| ∼ 10
5 s−1 at the frequency ω1 ≈ ω2 ∼ 10
15
s−1 seems to be easily achievable (for the wavelength λ0 = 1.3 µm, corresponding to the
optical fiber transparency window, ω ∼ 1015 s−1). To distinguish between the photons with
frequencies ω1 and ω2, the eavesdropper should measure the photon frequency with the
accuracy better then 105 c−1 which would result in the delay of order 10−5 s (i.e., effective
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increase in the line length by about 3 km). At the same time the difference between
the reduced photon registration moments T in the absence of eavesdropping can be made
rather small even with not too wide-band photodetectors. For the detector bandwidth
γ ∼ 109 s−1 (i.e., of the order of atomic level natural linewidth) T ∼ 1/γ ∼ 10−9 s (i.e.,
in the context of the present problem a photodetector with the bandwidth ∼ 109 s−1 can
already be regarded as a wide-band one).
We conclude with the following important remark. A similar scheme can be constructed
without the biphoton states if user A can send single photons with close energies h¯ω1 and
h¯ω2, for which the moments of their emission is known with sufficiently high accuracy.
For example, one can use the quantum dots where the electron lifetime at the excited
size-quantized level is of the order of 10−9 s: if electron is excited to such a level by
a short (picosecond) pulse, the photon emission time into the line can be regarded as
known to within 10−9 s. Therefore, if two such photon sources with frequencies separated
by ∼ 105 s−1 are available, they can be used to construct a cryptosystem based on the
time–energy uncertainty relation. Such a scheme has advantages over the interferometric
schemes since it does not require regular adjustment of the long-base interferometer [7].
The described cryptosystem also allows to distribute the key over a network of equivalent
users (by transferring it through a chain of users) over the distances exceeding the signal
decay length in the optical fiber in a way similar to that described in Ref.[20].
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